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The Effect of Heterogeneity on Cooperative Behaviour

Turnbull, V.N. (2016) The Effect of Heterogeneity on Cooperative Behaviour. Bachelor's Thesis, Industrial Engineering and Management.

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Abstract

This Integration Project investigates how heterogeneity in a finite decision-making population affects the steady-state number of cooperators in the population under the best response update rule. Finite populations are considered in which the players have a payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift or Coordination Game category. The players can be heterogeneous in the sense that their payoff matrices, and therefore also their thresholds, can be different. The level of heterogeneity of a population is measured by the standard deviation of the thresholds in the population. The steady-state numbers of cooperators of populations with different levels of heterogeneity are computed with game theoretic formulas or MATLAB simulations, and are structurally compared to each other. The main criterion set to ensure a fair comparison is that the average thresholds of the populations that are compared to each other should be the same. For populations with Coordination Game players, also the initial numbers of cooperators of the compared populations should be the same. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the results of this Integration Project is that, under the best-response update rule, heterogeneity in a finite decision-making population does not affect the steady-state number of cooperators in the population.

Item Type: Thesis (Bachelor's Thesis)
Degree programme: Industrial Engineering and Management
Thesis type: Bachelor's Thesis
Language: English
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2018 08:12
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2018 08:12
URI: http://fse.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/13963

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