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Facilitating cooperation by selective institutional reward and punishment’

Hiemstra, D A (2017) Facilitating cooperation by selective institutional reward and punishment’. Bachelor's Thesis, Industrial Engineering and Management.

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Abstract

In most previous studies the effect of equally distributed reward and punishment have been examined in homogeneous environments. In this research an extended public good game is developed with heterogeneous contributions and interactions. The public good game will be extended even more by the addition of an institution who can allocate incentive resources for reward and/or punishment. In numerical simulations these four policies are tested in a scale free network with heterogeneous contribution, interactions and the imitation of best neighbor update rule. The results show that one can promote the emergence of cooperation more in the population by allocating the resources proportional to their amount of connections than allocating it with the traditional equally distributed incentive policy. Besides this, from investigations with wealth distribution we concluded that the incentives have more impact in environments where the players con- tribute equally or the highly connected nodes contributes less than when the highly connected nodes contribute more to the common pool. Also in heterogeneous environments and with the different policies the carrot mastered the stick. A combination of punishment and reward could in some cases also facilitate more cooperation than solely the reward.

Item Type: Thesis (Bachelor's Thesis)
Degree programme: Industrial Engineering and Management
Thesis type: Bachelor's Thesis
Language: English
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2018 08:26
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2018 08:26
URI: http://fse.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/14903

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