Los, Maaike (2021) Choosing Fair Committees and Budgets: Proportionality in Multi-Winner Elections and Participatory Budgeting. Master's Thesis / Essay, Artificial Intelligence.
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Abstract
Participatory budgeting is a way to allow citizens to have a say in deciding how to spend public funds. It is a generalisation of multi-winner voting, where a committee is to be elected based on the preferences of multiple voters. An important topic in both multi-winner voting and participatory budgeting is fairness of committees or budgets. One way of expressing fairness and increasing the influence of minorities in a participatory budgeting project or multi-winner election, is requiring proportionality of a voting rule. But what is proportionality? Proportionality, although somewhat intuitive, is a complex concept, and can be defined in many different ways. We bring more structure in the landscape of proportionality axioms, and show the existence or non-existence of logical relations between different axioms. Furthermore, we investigate the axiomatic properties of some of the most important existing and some promising new rules for computing proportional committees or budgets and we systematically identify which axioms are satisfied by which voting rules, both in the multi-winner voting and the participatory budgeting setting.
| Item Type: | Thesis (Master's Thesis / Essay) |
|---|---|
| Supervisor name: | Grossi, D. and Christoff, Z.L. |
| Degree programme: | Artificial Intelligence |
| Thesis type: | Master's Thesis / Essay |
| Language: | English |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2021 09:16 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Jul 2021 09:16 |
| URI: | https://fse.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/25276 |
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