The Influence of Lying in a Negotiation Setting: Colored Trails

Brok, Sverre (2023) The Influence of Lying in a Negotiation Setting: Colored Trails. Master's Thesis / Essay, Artificial Intelligence.

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Abstract

With the growing capabilities of artificial agents, it is essential to shed light on the extent intelligent systems are willing to lie in negotiations. The current study examines lying in the game of Colored Trails, which is a negotiation setting in which two agents want to reach their own goal location that the other agent doesn't know and take turns proposing a new distribution of resources. Previous research suggests that a theory of mind capability is needed for an agent to lie. We introduce agents that are capable of theory of mind with the ability to lie. In particular, we extended Colored Trails and incorporated the possibility for both agents to send a message that tells the receiver that a particular goal location is the sender's goal location. This thesis presents two main contributions. First, a graphical user interface has been made where the behavior of the agents in Colored Trails can be analyzed. Second, different experiments have been performed to examine to what extent agents that can lie are able to achieve better outcomes than their honest counterparts. The results of the experiments show that, in general, higher orders of theory of mind provide more benefit to an agent in Colored Trails than the ability to lie. The results contribute to a foundation for making artificial intelligence more trustworthy.

Item Type:	Thesis (Master's Thesis / Essay)
Supervisor name:	Verbrugge, L.C. and Weerd, H.A. de
Degree programme:	Artificial Intelligence
Thesis type:	Master's Thesis / Essay
Language:	English
Date Deposited:	30 Aug 2023 13:41
Last Modified:	30 Aug 2023 13:41
URI:	https://fse.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/31338

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